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west, the lack of preparation and thinking in economic affairs, all contributed to keeping economic issues and policies in the background. Foreign trade, upon which Turkey depended greatly as a source of supply of essential import goods, was developing favorably until 1929, the time when the world depression started and its unfavorable reactions on trade and on international liquidity began to spread rapidly throughout the world.
I think it is not a mistake to trace the first stirrings and efforts to evolve something like a national development policy to the events of the year I930, when the world depression hit Turkish foreign trade very severely and caused catastrophic falls in the prices of agricultural commodities such as cereals, tobacco, and cotton, which were of prime importance to the predominantly agricultural Turkish economy and to the Turkish producer. The lowering of already low standards of life, caused by these developments and by concomitant increases in the burden of taxation, generated widespread dissatisfaction throughout the country. Around this time, Ataturk began to turn his thinking toward a search for new solutions, both in the political and the economic fields. The late twenties had been marked by an authoritarian one-party rule accompanied by strict control of the freedom of expression and by the political domination of a small bureaucraticmilitary elite. In the economic field, the revenues yielded by state monopolies in tobacco, alcoholic drinks, sugar, coffee, and tea, established for fiscal purposes, and by heavy indirect taxes were barely enough to cover a modest budget, a large proportion of which was spent on defense and on strategic investments such as railways. The stifling of political and cultural activities, together with growing economic stagnation in the late twenties, led Ataturk toward a new political experiment, involving the creation of an opposition party and establishing freedom of expression in the press. One of the principal objectives of the political change was to induce free discussions on economic issues, out of which would hopefully emerge new solutions and policies. The Free Party and the period of complete freedom of expression were short-lived affairs, lasting only about five months. Apart from the underlying political and cultural effects of the new experiment, however, a serious discussion began in the parliament and the press, around the role of the state in economic life. Up to that time, the main interventions of the state in the economy had been the creation of state monopolies in various fields and the construction of the railway network through the budget. The Free Party argued for the abolition of monopolies, greater competition in the economy, and the easing of the excessive tax burden through a slower and more gradual railway construction policy. The Republican Party defended its interventionist policies, arguing mainly that pure liberalism was unsuited to Turkey. The new concept of etatism was used for the first time during these discussions by both sides, without, however, acquiring the more definite sense it was to receive during the middle thirties. Whether the state should take complete responsibility for the management of the economy through the creation of comprehensive and monopolistic public enterprises in all its main branches or whether intervention should take the form of establishing and managing a certain number of government enterprises in selected key sectors of the economy, operating in addition to existing or future private firms. I have already discussed the ways in which this discussion proceeded, the main participants in it, and the consultations that took place on the subject of economic development between the Turkish government and a Soviet mission and American experts, in a paper submitted to the University of Chicago conference, held in November I973, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Republic, to be published by Turk Tarih Kurumu. I tried to show in that paper the heavy political and social consequence implied in the choice between the two alternative lines of policy then open to the Turkish government, underlining the noneconomic factors influencing the issue. By 1933-34, the thoughts of the government had crystallized around the policy of industrialization through the creation of government enterprises in certain selected sectors, a decision that created the mixed economy framework known at the time as etatism, according to which economic development has proceeded to the present. The above choice also emphasized the role of industry as the key sector of development, a strategic choice that has continued to dominate thinking and practice in subsequent periods. A few comments are necessary on the nature of the two basic strategic choices, the mixed economy and industrialization, as they seem to have been conceived by their authors, in the middle thirties.
In the first place, it appears that the establishment of the mixed economy framework was not intended to constitute a fundamental change in the economic system, although government leaders and Ataturk sometimes loosely referred to the new policy of etatism as something that was neither communism nor pure, undiluted liberalism. That no fundamental change was intended is shown by the absence of any move toward monopolizing the economy, in general, and the sector of industry, in particular, under government enterprises. Quite to the contrary, Law No. 3436 of 1938, which created a common legal framework for all government enterprises, expressly provided for the possibility of the eventual return of government enterprises to the public, through the issues of equity shares. Thus, the setting of a rigid frontier, of a dividing line, between the government and the private sector was not contemplated. Government enterprises were asked, in the law mentioned above, to behave in their operations exactly like ordinary profitmaking commercial enterprises. In other words, the price mechanism was kept as the final regulator for both sectors of the economy. Quite apart from measures concerning the new government sector, its intended behavior and its relations to private enterprises, the attitude taken in respect to the most sensitive issue in economics, namely, money and finance, reveals the conservative, indeed orthodox, strand in the economic thinking of Ataturk and his concern to preserve economic stability and the traditional functioning of the economy. In this respect the fact that there was no departure from the prevailing strict financial orthodoxy, when the big problem of financing the new industrial investments came up during the thirties, is very significant.
Thus, in the minds of its authors, etatism did not constitute a farflung attempt at ideological change, but represented a pragmatic response, both to the problems created by the world depression and to the more general issue of economic development, which consisted in lifting the Turkish people toward Western civilized standards. It was, in Ataturk's words, a shortcut to speed up the process of westernization.
The same impression of the absence of a dogmatic, doctrinaire approach toward economic development is revealed by a look at the contents of industrialization as they appear in the first five-year industrialization plan adopted in 1934. Here, again, there are no signs of visionary and utopian thinking, of high-sounding industrialization model. The industries were chosen mostly on sound economic criteria, such as the availability of ready markets, substitution for essential imports, and the availability of internal raw materials. The largest investments occurred in textiles, an industry in which Turkey had a natural and historical comparative advantage, followed by iron and steel, cement and paper. Consumer goods industries predominated, although investment goods such as iron and steel and cement were also included in the program. Noneconomic considerations, however, such as social, cultural, and strategic factors, also played some part in the choice and the location of the new plants. Strategic influences could be detected in the decision to build an iron and steel plant which would supply railways and the armaments industry under the Ministry of Defense, in its economically unfavorable location, far from the Black Sea coast. The predominance of sociocultural factors over economic considerations was also evident in general location policy, most of the fourteen new plants constructed under the first five-year plan being situated at different localities in western and central Anatolia, while only two new plants were placed in Istanbul, already the largest industrial center of the country.
Decisions that ran counter to pure cost considerations, such as the regional dispersal of industry and the dissemination of new plants in different localities, should be interpreted as socially, politically, and culturally motivated desires to spread the benefits of industry throughout the country and thus hopefully speed up the process of modernization. I turn now to the third main trend in economic policy, namely, economic nationalism. Here we are up against a more elusive current of ideas, which seems to change in intensity and variety over time, something the roots of which go much further back into the past than industrialization and the mixed economy, and which is made up of various political and emotional elements.
One Apart from the memories of the past, another set of motives was the tendency toward economic self-sufficiency that has marked, and still marks in various degrees and forms, the policies of many countries, developed and developing. Although economics pays lip service to the principles of comparative advantage and of international specialization of resources, when it comes to putting such principles into effect, politicians and even economists often take a different line in most countries. Some evidence of this attitude may be detected in the choice of investments under the industrialization plans of the thirties, in particular in the decision to build a self-sufficient sugar industry in Turkey, in spite of the large difference between home costs and world prices.
Finally, it seems that vague and emotional feelings of national pride and of reserve toward foreigners have also played a part, in various forms and degrees, in contributing to the trend of economic nationalism. In the case of Turkey, these feelings may have been reinforced by the large cultural and social gap existing between itself and the West.
Together, the several elements noted above have combined to feed the current of economic nationalism, the effects of which have been felt in various forms and intensities, although it is not easy to assess the forms and degrees of their impact upon policies. What were the causes of the resilience of the mixed economy framework during the fifties? I suggest they were both political and economic. First of all, the difficulties surrounding the valuation of assets, in the absence of a capital market, created an insuperable economic obstacle to the sale of state factories to the public. Second, the economic and political benefits that could be derived from using the government economic sector as an investment instrument were realized by the government. The possibility existed of using the state economic enterprises in policies of regional development and of spreading industries to various regions, in ways that private enterprises could not carry out, owing to prohibitive costs. Such possibilities also created vote-catching advantages in the provinces involved. Finally, the state sector provided an important source of employment creation, which could also be used for political patronage purposes. These potentialities could turn out to have positive or negative effects, on balance, according to the wisdom and degree of soundness of the decisions they made possible.
III
In the end, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages and in the early sixties, the most urgent problems centered on the elimination of the economic distortions caused by the inflationary policies of the Democrats and the problem of avoiding the repetition of a number of politically motivated, economically unsound investment projects. So, minds were turning toward the search for economic and political reforms designed to prevent the recurrence of past mistakes. It was believed that the hoped-for solution lay in the establishment of a state planning organization, attached to the Prime Ministry and enshrined in the I96I Constitution, as one of the constitutional organs of the Republic. This organization would draw up both long-term and yearly investment programs for the whole economy, which would be designed to maintain overall balance between available resources and intended expenditures, thereby preventing inflationary pressures. Further, these plans, after having been approved by the government and parliament, would not be exposed any more to the whims and pressures of political or local interest groups.
The question of deepest interest here is whether the introduction of comprehensive planning for the whole economy affected the framework and functioning of the mixed economy. More specifically, did the thinking behind the establishment of planning represent a change in emphasis concerning government intervention in the economy, a move toward larger state control of the operation and of the investments of the economy? Undoubtedly, there were people in Turkey, both inside the plan organization and outside it, who tended to consider the role of the government in the economy on ideological lines and hoped the outcome of planning would be that the government assumed an overriding control of the economy, in all its sectors. Following a conflict over fiscal policy between the then leaders of the plan organization and the first elected government after military rule, the ideological way of looking at planning retreated and became a minority view in parliament and in the country. The role of the plan organization was accepted as essentially advisory. The investment programs it drew up would be binding only on the state sector and would insure the necessary degree of coordination both within the sector and between itself and the private sector. It should also be noted that the I96I Constitution, in addition to setting up a plan organization, had reaffirmed its belief in the principles of the mixed economy and proclaimed it as the official economic regime of the country.
Constitution or no constitution, the mixed economy continued to serve as the framework of development under the civilian coalition governments, the Justice Party government, and the coalition governments that followed it, till the present time. Since all reforms directed at the state economic enterprises, especially the attempts made after I96I, have failed, the state economic sector has continued to present problems and burdens to the economy and the private sector has, in recent years, become the most dynamic sector. The mixed economy framework still retains enough strength and advantages to give it an unquestioned status as the dominating economic regime.
The second basic strategy of development established in the thirties was industrialization. Under the conditions prevailing during the thirties and within the framework of etatism, the initial stimulus to industrialization was to come from state investments, although there was no necessity for state predominance in industrial investments to continue forever. Quite the contrary, no obstacles were put in the way of private activities; indeed, provisions were made in the basic law of 1938 about allowing eventual sale of state economic enterprises to the public. Thus, the original intention was that industrialization would eventually acquire a broad basis and spread throughout the economy.
During thirties to arrive at a position of near equality with the private sector, the activities of which began in the period before World War I. Between I950 and I954, employment in the state sector increased very little, whereas it showed a big jump in the private sector, with the result that in 1954 its share of employment had increased considerably over that of the state sector. Subsequently, investment and production in the state sector was boosted strongly following the change in the investment policy of the Democratic Party government. Employment in the private sector increased at a rate more or less equal to that of the state sector. The growth of the private sector in industry constituted essentially a response to the market forces that were emerging in Turkey after World War II. Here, I venture to suggest that the emergence of such a response is not always the automatic spontaneous mechanism that economic theory assumes. The volume and quality of this response depends upon material, physical factors as well as upon much more intangible, invisible conditions. The existence of an adequate infrastructure is the most important physical factor. Invisible factors include psychological attitude, training, education, organizational ability, and risktaking. These are probably more difficult to develop than material factors and take a longer time to establish themselves.
The 
IV
This survey of the evolution of the three trends which I defined as the basic development strategies, from the time of Ataturk down to the present, has, I think, brought out the remarkable degree of continuity they have maintained and the influences they have exercised all along, over the form and content of development policy in Turkey, despite the many farreaching changes in conditions that have occurred since then. This survey has concentrated on the factors and motivations that have led to the emergence of these trends and, later on, to their continuity through time.
My own evaluation of overall results in terms of economic development, an evaluation that is bound to be impressionistic and general, is that on balance the economic strategies laid down in the early thirties have had, singly and in combination, positive effects in initiating and maintaining a movement of economic development in Turkey. Naturally, we are still quite far from being near the levels of economic prosperity achieved by neighboring Western Mediterranean countries, such as Greece and Italy, not to speak of the levels of the more advanced Western European states. The crucial questions in economic development, however, turn more on the momentum that development acquires through time than upon, say, the actual level of income per head achieved at any time or upon disparities in per capita income among different countries. The essential problem is that of achieving a self-generating, self-sustaining movement, which no longer depends on any outside stimulation or artificial support that may have been necessary at the outset. Following the thinking and terminology of Walt Rostow, once a broadly based, spontaneous movement has come into existence, the question of development has really been solved, or to put it more mildly, is securely on the way to a solution. This is because development means the creation and spread of many individual and corporate initiatives and energies directed at economic ends. Once they are brought into being, these initiatives and energies will then continue expanding and developing on their own. I believe this is what Rostow described as self-sustaining growth. It has to be pointed out that a self-sustained economy does not mean an economy that is able to grow by simply relying on itself and on its own resources, as is sometimes mistakenly believed. On the contrary, it means an economy that is growing by relying both on itself and on other national economies, through the expansion in the volume of its exchanges of goods and services with other nations. The notion of national economic independence, which is often linked to the concept of economic development in Turkey and in other developing nations, does not imply the achievement of economic self-sufficiency or the acquisition of a growing capacity to do without foreign trade or without international exchange of services and of factors of production. On the contrary, growth and national economic independence in this sense are completely incompatible in our modern age. The notion of national economic independence, if it has any meaning at all, indicates the capacity of developing the national economy, through its evergrowing integration with the world economy, without artificial support from outside, such as foreign assistance on concessionary terms.
The question is whether Turkey has achieved or is nearing a state of selfsustained development in this wider sense, through the development strategies it has been following in the past forty to fifty years. I have suggested that the evaluation should go beyond studying and comparing rates of growth of GNP or levels of income per head. A few words should be said, however, about the trends in the main indicators of development.
Taking the growth rate during the periods when figures are available, we observe on the whole, a more or less marked rise in total and per capita growth rates, as between the pre-World War II and the post-World War II periods. Thus, in the nine-year period I927-1935, before the,state industrialization drive got going, the total growth rate in national income amounted to 30 percent, represented roughly an average growth rate of around 3.3 percent per annum. In per capita terms, the total increase over the period was only I2 percent, representing roughly a yearly growth rate of I.5 percent per annum. In the four-year period I935-I938, however, the global growth rate in national income amounted to around 25 percent, indicating roughly a yearly growth rate of around 6 percent, and a per capita yearly average growth of almost 4 percent.7 There has been a welcome tendency for the share of industrial goods in total exports to grow, especially in the field of textiles, leather goods, and cement. I have already referred to certain positive and negative developments flowing from nationalist feelings of isolation and apprehension. This is a difficult and elusive subject to evaluate, but I would venture the opinion that it is the most important and crucial field in the future of Turkey's economy. The present developments in the world economy, such as the growth in international capital movements, the formation of large trading blocs among countries, the rapid developments in technology in Western countries and the increasing necessity for developing countries to transfer technological knowledge from abroad, and the extension of the operation of multinational companies all over the world, make it clearer every day that the days of following the paths of inward-looking nationalism and of seeking ways to ensure self-sufficiency for a single country are passed. No nation that wants to continue to play a part in the world, both economically and politically, can afford to turn its back on the world and rely on self-sufficiency for its development.
In Turkey. It may perhaps be unfair to ask for too rapid and drastic changes in deep attitudes and feelings, although Turkish workers abroad have shown a capacity for quick adaptation. It is more justified, I think, to demand that some of the immediate contradictions marking foreign economic policy be lifted so that all concerned can at least know where they stand.
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